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Abstract  
Developed economies have been severely hurt over the last decade. Low inflation and 
unbalanced growth forced authorities to implement unconventional measures like 
negative interest rates. The unbalanced environment in financial markets is also visible 
on the commodity market. The prices of commodities have already experienced second 
contraction over the last decade. However, according to Frankel (2012) the changes in 
prices of commodities are heavily determined by real interest rates. This thesis 
summarizes implications resulting from negative nominal interest rates and then takes a 
closer look on the connections between changes in interest rates and the movements in 
commodity market. We use vector error correction model to investigate impact of 
nominal macroeconomic factors on the set of 16 commodities of different types (metal, 
energy and industrial commodities). As expected, our findings confirmed that the price 
changes in the commodity market are in the long run significantly linked with inflation 
as well as with nominal interest rates. The analysis also supports the claims of 
considerable correlation among prices themselves but provides no evidence of negative 
interest rate policy impact on the commodity market.  
 
Abstrakt 
Rozvinuté ekonomiky boli v poslednom desaťročí výrazne zasiahnuté. Nízka inflácia a 
nevyvážený rast viedli k implementácii nekonvenčných opatrení ako napríklad 
negatívne úrokové sadzby. Nestabilné prostredie na finančných trhoch je tiež viditeľné v 
prípade komoditného trhu. Ceny komodít zaznamenali už druhý pokles za posledné 
desaťročie. Avšak, podľa J. Frankela (2012) sú zmeny cien komodít výrazne určované 
reálnymi úrokovými sadzbami. Táto práca sumarizuje dôsledky vyplývajúce z 
negatívnych nominálnych úrokových sadzieb a následne bližšie skúma prepojenie 
medzi zmenami úrokových sadzieb a pohybmi na komoditnom trhu. Na preskúmanie 
vplyvu nominálnych makroekonomických faktorov na množinu 16 komodít rôzneho 
druhu (kovy, energetické a priemyselné komodity) používame vektorový model 
korekcie chýb. Naše zistenia potvrdili očakávanie, že zmeny cien na komoditnom trhu 
sú v dlhodobom horizonte významne spojené ako s infláciou, tak aj s nominálnymi 
úrokovými sadzbami. Analýza tiež podporuje tvrdenia týkajúce sa značnej korelácie 
medzi samotnými cenami, ale neposkytuje žiadne dôkazy o vplyve politiky negatívnych 
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 “That doesn’t mean I think it’s the end of the world when it ends, but I don’t 
think anybody knows exactly what the full implications” of negative rates will be. I hope 
to live long enough to find out,” – Warren Buffet 
 
Initiated by a strong development of China’s market and followed by a steady 
growth and expansionary macroeconomic environment around the world, the prices of 
all commodities skyrocketed and reached their peak in July 2008, especially the prices 
of metals and energy which were twice as higher as in 2003. This boom showed two 
similarities with previous price explosions of commodities
1
 according to J.Baffes and 
T.Haniotis (2010) – firstly, all took place in the shadow of a high and strong economic 
growth and all were followed by a serious depression. In contrast with the other 
however, this expansion was accompanied by a steep growth in real estate and equity 
markets and was the only one where all three main types of commodities – energy, 
metals and agriculture – grew simultaneously. The sudden blast of the real-estate bubble 
plummeted the prices, sometimes to the levels from 2003. Nobody had foreseen such a 
drop.  
In addition, during the financial crisis of 2008, the use of traditional measures 
was found inadequate and the use of unorthodox tools was now considered.  “There is a 
consensus that central banks require additional tools to address the problems that can 
occur in financial markets and that inflation targeting was an insufficient policy tool in 
the past.” (Bruce V. Rauner, 2009) Several states started injecting money into the 
market in the form of quantitative easing. However, the recession stroke really hard and 
the first recovery in 2011/2012 failed which lead the system into another collapse. The 
system struggled with deflation, interest rates had been pushed to zero along with huge 
money injections and the market was teeming with idle risk-averse people.  
As nominal interest rates of more countries crossed 1% level, the financial 
instruments started becoming unworthy to be invested in as they yielded almost nothing. 
It was fairly expected that investors would somehow react to these significant shocks in 
financial markets and consequently they adjusted their portfolios. It was just a matter of 
the time till the commodity market experienced the inflow of funds again. Hence 
                                                 
1
 There were two major commodity booms in the post‐WWII period (during the Korean War) and the 
early 1970s energy crisis 




commodities encountered a comeback in their value and rose back to the pre-crisis 
altitudes. Certain studies have pointed out that there is correlation between prices of 
commodities and the real interest rate (Frankel, 2012). Therefore, it could have been 
expected to see that as nominal interest rates were reaching zero bound and the majority 
of developed countries suffered from deflation, the commodities were becoming more 
valuable. This prevailing unfavorable economic situation in the world and growing 
distrust for conventional investments and counter measures yield its fruits. 
Consequently, after the introduction of quantitative easing by several countries, 
another unorthodox measure was presented - negative interest rates, previously regarded 
as an impossible event. The theory tells us that by decreasing the interest rate, the 
incentive to lend also diminishes. If we set negative interest rates then even the principal 
is not fully returned. This should therefore never happen by simple math and 
consideration. 
It was considered as a non-existing event a few years ago according to the 
member of the Executive Board of the ECB L.B. Smaghi:  “…the economic shock is so 
powerful that the nominal interest rate needs to be brought down to zero. At that level, 
cutting policy rates further is not possible, so any additional monetary stimulus can be 
undertaken only by resorting to unconventional monetary policy tools.” It would be 
appropriate to clarify what this ground-breaking policy exactly means. According to the 
definition by Investopedia, the negative interest rate policy (NIRP) is an unconventional 
monetary policy tool whereby nominal target interest rates are set with a negative value, 
below the theoretical lower bound of zero percent.  
 This thesis will be structured in the following manner. In chapter 2, we will 
describe the theory behind interest rates in detail and uncover their influential flows to 
the economy. Moreover, the phenomenon of negative interest rates will be introduced, 
its implications and impossibility in theory. Also there will be a briefly described 
phenomenon of zero lower bound. In chapter 3 we will provide details about history and 
development of the NIR. In fact, there are only five central banks which introduced this 
unconventional policy – the SNB, DNB, Sveriges Riksbank, ECB and BoJ. (Hungary 
also adopted the NIR, but only on the deposit rate which is not its CBPR). In chapter 4, 
the situation on the commodity market in the last decade and then the connection with 
interest rates will be explained. Chapter 5 then focuses on data including description of 
source dataset and issues that had to be resolved during its gathering and manipulation. 
Furthermore, variables that are controlled for in our analysis are also explained. Chapter 




6 describes the used methodology and all encountered issues related to it. Chapter 7 
summarizes the results and provides some information about possible improvements 



































2 What are negative interest rates? 
The phenomenon of negative interest rate is aptly described by Matthew 
Campbell and Peter Levring (2016): 
“A monetary policy tool once viewed by mainstream economists as approaching 
apostasy, if not a virtual impossibility.” 
Prior to a closer look at the implications of negative interest rates and the 
phenomenon preceding it, we should clarify what are interest rates in general. 
2.1 What is the interest rate? 
The interest rate is a fee charged by a lender to a borrower expressed as a 
percentage of the principal.  
This borrowed asset can have different forms, i.e. cash, consumer goods, large 
assets like cars or buildings, land etc. It is a rent that we pay for an apartment or land or 
a lease on the car. To some extent, the interest is included in the majority of transactions 
we do. The interest rate is mostly associated with deposits, loans, mortgages, pension 
funds, bonds, stocks and other securities. The level of interest is linked with risks of 
lending – if it is more likely that we will get back assets we lent when the rate of interest 
is lower and vice versa. Therefore, the interest rates on deposits and government bonds 
are very low while the interest rates on loan, mortgages and stocks tend to be higher.  
However, it is a great difference between nominal interest rate and real interest 
rate. Interest rates of common use are called “nominal”. If we adjust it for the inflation, 
we get the “real” interest rate. In practice we subtract inflation from the nominal interest 
rate. The real interest rate measures a value in purchasing power – that means if the 
amount of goods that we can buy after some period (with principal plus interest) is the 
same as the amount affordable before that period (with the principal only). 
There are numerous types of interest rates on the market: 
- Discount rate – the rate at which eligible institutions can borrow some 
liquidity from the central bank (the term usually linked with the FED) 
- Refinancing rate – or minimum bid, is the interest rate at which other 
banks can borrow some liquidity from central bank (the term usually 
linked with the ECB) 
- Repo rate – the discount rate at which government bonds are repurchased 
by the central bank from commercial banks 




- Deposit rate – the interest rate that is paid by financial institutions to 
deposit account holders 
- Lending rate – the interest rate that banks charge on money that they lend 
- Interbank rate – the interest rate charged among commercial banks on 
short-term loans. This rate is usually differentiated according to 
creditworthiness of the borrower or the objective of financing. 
 
Another type of interest rate, at first glance not as specific, is the Central Bank 
policy rate (CBPR) or the key interest rate. The central bank uses this interest rate to 
enact or signal its monetary policy heading. The central banks’ policy making 
committees (e.g. Fed Open Market Committee) are usually authorized to make 
decisions over this rate. Since the underlying financial instrument of the CBPR is 
selected by the banks themselves, it can differ from country to country. For instance, the 
Governing Council of the ECB sets these three key interest rates for the Eurozone:  the 
interest rate on the main refinancing operations, the rate on the deposit facility and the 
rate on the marginal lending facility. In some other countries the CBPR is the discount 
rate (e.g. Denmark, Japan) while it is a repurchase agreement rate in the others (e.g. 
Sweden, Singapore) 
The short term interest rate is one of the main instruments of a monetary policy. 
In addition, interest rate, inflation, exchange rate and money base create group of 
nominal anchors for monetary policy. Nominal anchor is usually one of these variables 
that is selected by the central bank to pin down expectations of private agents about 
development of nominal prices and other important factors. Tools used to control these 
monetary targets can be divided into two groups. Traditional tools, the first group, are 
used commonly by the central banks to drive economy to expand or to contract. There 
are three - open market operations, the discount rate and the reserve requirements.  
The second group is called “unconventional” monetary tools. These measures 
are used in the case of very low nominal interest rates where the deflation is threatening 
or is already occurring. In this group we find credit easing, quantitative easing, forward 
guidance and signaling  
 




2.2 The interest rates in theory 
It is known that commercial banks are paid by central banks to hold money in 
their deposits in order to secure liquidity. Households and firms are receiving payments 
for entrusting and lending (i.e. storing) their savings to bank facilities. Loan and 
mortgage rates depend on the level of interest, too. Thus the influence of interest rates is 
significant on the market. The theory/system is based on logical assumptions that banks 
yield the profit when borrowing and/or that households and firms are better off when 
storing their money to banks. 
The aforementioned theory is well-described by IS-LM model, where the IS 
curve (Investments - Savings) defines balance on the capital market and, similarly, on 
the market of goods and services. On the other hand, the LM curve (Liquidity 
preference - Money supply) defines balance on the money market and the likewise 
balance on the bond market. (Cahlík, Hlaváček & Seidler, 2010) Main endogenous 
variables in this model are interest rate (depicted on the vertical axis) and output (i.e. 
income, depicted on the horizontal axis). According to nature of the IS curve, 
investments and consumption are discouraged by higher real interest rate, therefore the 
IS curve is downward sloping while the LM curve represents an opposite effect here. If 
the output increases, households react to the rise in demand for money by selling the 
securities. Consequently, the bond market is hit by excess supply and that pushes the 
interest rates up – hence upward slope of the curve. 
 
Figure 1- Fiscal and Monetary policy in IS-LM model 
Source: Macroeconomics (Cahlík et al.,2010) 




Figure 1 depicts a situation in which economic authorities – government and 
central bank – aim to boost the economy and increase output. Sole expansive monetary 
policy, e.g. money injections, shifts in the LM curve to the right (point 2). Sole 
expansive fiscal policy shifts the IS curve to the right (point 3). Both cases are followed 
by a growth in output, but expensive monetary intervention decreases interest rate and 
increases investment whereas expansive fiscal policy increases interest rate and 
decreases investment. The need of government or central bank to change the level of 
output or interest rate can be achieved by an appropriate combination of fiscal and 
monetary policies (either expansive or restrictive). As pointed out, the character of 
expansive monetary policy is employed during economic downturns to boost the 
economy, but it definitely has its limits. 
Theory of the IS-LM model considers the minimum output of zero and the same 
holds for interest rate – in the case of output, the association is straightforward as there 
is no possibility of having negative production. 
The position of interest rate is slightly different but clearly nobody is willing to 
pay for the service when it is provided by themselves. (e.g. to lend €1000 without 
getting back at least €1000) Therefore, the zero interest rate is considered to be an 
effective lower bound of interest rates. 
2.3 Paradox of the thrift 
In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), Keynes 
claims that one effective tool against a recessed economy is more spending, more risk-
taking, and less saving. Market with living subjects and many streams of funds is 
boosting itself and through the “centrifugal forces”, it should eventually recover back to 
growth – which Keynes called “circular flow”. Essentially, it is in contradicting the 
typical behavior in the market/economy little bit as people tend to reduce their expenses 
as much as possible during the tough times and save for the possible worse ones. 
However, this approach of preparing for “the worse” may actually bury the system in 
the end and drag it into a vicious circle, illustrated by Figure 2. The decline in demand 
implies cost-cutting by companies (higher unemployment and/or lower wages), 
followed by a decrease in spending and investing leading to a further reduction in 
demand and so on – so-called deflationary spiral. 
 
 














Figure 2 - Deflationary spiral, whose elements circularly reinforce each other 
Source: snbchf.com 
This phenomenon is identified as “Paradox of the Thrift”, or Paradox of Savings, 
whose first conceptual description was probably mentioned first in The Fable of the 
Bees (1732) by Bernard Mandeville. Nevertheless, this theory has its drawbacks which 
are frequently criticized. Firstly, it overlooks Say’s Law message according to which the 
decline in demand implies lowering of prices by producers and hence people will 
continue their spending. This point is still a subject of debates as New Keynesian 
economists reject Say’s law and argue against this argument by “rigidity of prices” – 
stating that prices are unable to respond fast enough. Secondly, people’s unwillingness 
to spend increases their saving rate and subsequently the amount of loanable funds 
(assuming that they do not squirrel cash away into a mattress). That allows banks to 
make lending more attractive by lowering the lending rate in order to stimulate 
investments and spending. Some comments
2
 to this argument have been raised stating 
the fact that banks themselves may sit on these extra funds to cover deposits (the growth 
in excessive reserves). This line of thoughts is leading to a phenomenon known as 
“liquidity trap”. For these reasons, the phenomenon is frequently a subject of debates 
among economic society. 
2.4 Negative interest rates. Why negative? 
After the financial crisis of 2007/2008, economies all around the world went into 
recession for a decent couple of years and adopted several fiscal or monetary policies to 
overcome it. Stagnation in demand pushed the levels of inflation down, growth was 
                                                 
2
 However, if people choose to hold cash rather than to deposit them than there will be no growth in 
loanable funds. More about this topic can be found in paper by R.W.Garrison (2005) 




unconvincing, time of price stability was still behind the horizon and thus in line with 
common standards, central authorities responded by cutting interest rates. 
During deepening of the crisis, authorities all around the world were fighting 
with the recession by making money more attractive as can be observed on Figure 3. 
Many of them squeezed their interest rates under the 1% rate already in 2010, slowly 
approaching zero and almost exhausting the firepower of interest rate. Surely, interest 
rate setup is not the only instrument used by central authorities. Several central banks 
decided to initiate huge money injections known as “quantitative easing”
3
. This bond-
buying program is based on purchasing government bonds or financial assets of private 
banks in order to stimulate spending and investments by increasing money supply. The 
difference between QE and other classic bond-buying monetary tools is that standard 
central bank monetary policies are aimed at short-run interest rate and if contraction is 
long enough to withstand lowering interest rate to zero, the central bank has to stop with 
these actions and use other tools. Only then the implementation of unconventional 
techniques may be the next step made by the central bank since QE influences the long-
term interest rate. Thus main aim of this policy is to increase money supply and also to 

















                                                 
3
 This term was firstly used by Bank of Japan when struggling with deflation in early 2000’s 
4
 Risky because if is not balanced out, the cash inflow can shoot inflation too high, or can be ignored by 
the banks unwilling to lend it out 




To sum up, in cases where the potential of classic economic tools is limited, 
there is a place for unusual ones such as quantitative easing. Similarly, another even 
more unorthodox measure knocked on the doors/crossed minds – negative interest rates 
and matter of zero lower bound. 
Zero lower bound is a subject to many discussions when it comes to monetary 
policy or interest rates. Zero-bound interest rate is described by Investopedia as “The 
lowest percentage of owed principal that a central bank can set. In monetary policy, the 
use of a 0% nominal interest rate means that the central bank can no longer reduce the 
interest rate to encourage economic growth. As the interest rate approaches the zero 
bound, the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced as a macroeconomic tool.” 
However, the relevance of this phenomenon was not very often taken seriously before 
2008 despite several encounters mainly related to the Great Depression in the US (1929-
30s) and Switzerland during the late 1970s
5
. 
Zero lower bound is generally considered as effective lower bound, as was 
mentioned in subchapter 2.1. Yet, it can be suggested that under specific circumstances, 
the effective lower bound can be actually somewhere in negative region because 
investors are willing to pay in certain situations to keep their funds safe. Brunnermeier 
and Koby (2016) argue in their study that so-called “reversal rate” exists which marks 
the line/point at which “accommodative monetary policy “reverses” its effect and 
becomes contractionary for lending. The level of this rate is not clearly stated as it is 
determined by economic environment and financial sector’s balance variables and zero 
may thus not be strictly binding – “…there is room to go negative up to that point, 
provided that financial stability is secured.” Judging by the events of the last couple of 
years, it can be said that this myth is refuted/severely fractured. Negative interest rates 
are the reality at this moment and there are a couple of unanswered questions arising. 
What implications does the NIR have? Can a system withstand this measure or it is the 
beginning of the end? 
This potential zero limit is pulling the break on monetary interventions as 
explained above. As the face value of fiat money does not change over time, the option 
of households to hoard cash is quite compelling reason why rates are not expected to 
fall below zero. However, if all means are drained then even the unthinkable is 
reconsidered and the central banks would eventually announce setting key rates of 
                                                 
5
 Japan was taken as special case despite wrestling with ZLB for decades 




negative sign. This key rate is represented in different countries by different financial 
instruments regarding the explanation in the previous chapter, but the overall 
transmission mechanism (from implementing new policy to actually influence common 
life of households) is actually quite complicated and sluggish. The policy adopted by the 
central bank directly influences commercial banks which than implement these changes, 
in their own way, into the life of people. Thus central bankers set the negative rates and 
leave all decisions on commercial banks. As already mentioned, the zero-interest yield 
of cash argument does effectively impede (well, under specific conditions have been 
negative deposit rates experienced in practice
6
) banks to directly set negative deposit 
rates. Therefore, the decision is met either with keeping no excessive reserves as the 
negative interest is imposed only on reserves over some limit or with compensating the 
negative yield via squeezing discount or other rates. 
According to Mercein et al. (2016) there are three main channels by which 
policy objectives are reached through lower or negative interest rates. 
- The spending channel – stimulating spending of consumers by lowering 
earnings from deposits. This intrusion into profits should discourage 
saving, motivate to spend and consequently, impale economic production 
stagnation/spark the economic production, and generate inflation. 
- The exchange rate channel – steering flows of money out of country by 
creating unpleasant business environment in order to depreciate currency. 
Weaker currency makes domestic goods cheaper compared with the one 
produced abroad hence stimulating exports, driving growth, and 
subsequent inflation. 
- The asset valuation channel – decreasing discount rate on securities and 
removing obstacles for investments to some extent. Promoting better 
financial support to companies can drive their investments and boost 
economic growth as well as inflation of asset prices. 
On the other hand, there are also other reasons to lower interest rate aside from 
driving inflation – protecting the exchange rate and thus avoiding the currency to be 
overvalued. Obviously, it is the logic of the second channel but against a different foe – 
excessive money inflow and subsequent currency appreciation. Clearly, if interest rates 
                                                 
6
There are several central banks that adapted negative deposit rates – ECB, SNB,MNB (Hungary), Norges 
Bank (Norway) and Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden) 




cross the zero line and follow a negative trend then these processes and outcomes are 
augmented. 
 
2.5 How to overcome zero lower bound? 
We will look into the issue of the ZLB from the previous subchapter. Several 
suggestions have been made by economists on how to circumvent the zero line and 
sustain the power of the central banks. 
One of the first suggestions was made by Silvio Gesell in the 19th century when 
he proposed a tax on holding cash - a thought also cited and approved by John Maynard 
Keynes. In 2009, Greg Mankiw mentioned a serial number lottery in which bank notes 
with specific ending digit were randomly chosen to be declared worthless so that people 
would be gambling if they were to hold on to cash. 
If there is an interest levied on financial instruments, then why not introducing 
an interest on physical currency as well? This would probably solve the problem of 
hoarding cash as the most liquid asset would have lost its “zero loss, zero gain” status. 
Let’s break it down. All financial instruments can be split into two categories: registered 
instruments and bearer instruments. Registered ones are those where identity of the 
owner is known and their record exists in some publicly available database. Therefore, 
the issuer knows the owner’s identity. For instance, common stocks and bank accounts 
are among registered instruments. Imposing negative interest rates on bank accounts can 
be put into practice as easily as positive interest rates – just a change in inputs in ledger. 
To “pay up” negative dividends is technically possible but illegal in most jurisdictions. 
However, it can be stated that stocks are able to yield negative nominal value in the end 
due to volatility in their market value. On the other hand, main attribute of bearer 
instruments is an unknown identity of the owner. Therefore, the issuer does not possess 
any knowledge about the holder’s identity. This aspect makes it difficult to pay even a 
positive interest as it has to be dealt with multiple-payment-on-the-one-instrument issue. 
An attempt to claim a negative interest rate on bearer instrument is even harder – how 
can people be forced to reveal their identity and pay? Thus in the fashion of Buiter 
(2009): “The reason no interest, at a positive or at a negative rate, is paid on currency 
is that it is costly and administratively awkward and intrusive to do so.” 
According to suggestions made by Kenneth Rogoff (2014), the consideration to 
phase out fiat money would be a constructive approach to how to eliminate the last 




alternative to avoid paying negative interest rate on bonds and bank deposits. Likewise, 
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 Buiter (2009) suggests also to separate numéraire from currency and establish an adjustable exchange 
rate between them to be able to control for changes in monetary policy – e.g. introduction of negative 
nominal interest rates 




3 Brief history and development of the NIRP 
As stated before, the phenomenon of negative interest rates is not very well 
explored as it is considered as impossible in theory. Nonetheless, there are studies 
dealing with the implementation of these controversial policies by several central banks. 
To be more precise, there are only five authorities that have ventured into the once-
uncharted territory of this policy in the recent years – the ECB (European Central 
Bank), the BoJ (Bank of Japan), the DNB (Denmark National Bank), the SNB (Swiss 
National Bank) and the Swedish Riksbank. In the next paragraphs, we will briefly 
describe how this adaptation was managed and the reasons why the NIRP was the 
favored option. 
3.1 The first experience 
Struggles with inconveniently strong exchange rate have a rich history in 
Switzerland. It can be pointed out that there is a connection between these monetary 
decisions and the break-up of Breton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Moreover, 
we should not leave aside an effect of the prevailing monetary situation in Europe back 
then. In the 1970s, Switzerland used negative interest rates (the NIR) to counter their 
currency appreciation due to a wave of investors fleeing inflation in other parts of the 
world. They imposed the NIR on deposits of non-residents, from 2% in 1972 up to 10% 
in 1978. Surely, intentions of the SNB were not to fight the deflation but the actual 
results spoke for themselves – “This policy lasted only until 1982, when the Swiss 
realized that inflation was too high a price to pay for a weak currency” (Paul Meggyesi, 
2010) 
3.2 The second wave of implementation 
From 2012, all four above mentioned European authorities crossed zero bound 
led by the DNB. In order to answer the question why Denmark played the role of 
Columbus in this scenario and for proper understanding of influential flows and 
consequent effects, we should briefly describe the situation in Europe. 
Part of the EMS (European Monetary System) introduced by the EEC (European 
Economic Community) in 1979 was the ERM I (Exchange Rate Mechanism) whose 
main purpose was to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability in 
Europe in preparation for a new single currency – the euro. Therefore, European 




currencies were pegged to the ECU (European Currency Unit). The 1st January 1999 
marks a replacement of the ECU by euro and the adaptation of this new currency by 
several European states. The referendum in Denmark closely rejected the acceptation of 
euro but entered the ERM II where it is currently its only member. The ERM I & II 
allow fluctuation in the exchange rate and in the case of Danish krone, the deviance is 
very little also in the ERM II – only 2.25%. Therefore, the DNB has a sole role in 
maintaining the peg. Thus when European debt crisis reached its periodic peak in 2012, 
risk-averse investors saw krone as a stable port and exchange rate margins were 
threatened. A counter move of the DNB was a decrease in interest rate in order to stem 
hot money inflow but at that time, the country was already wrestling with a very low 
interest rate so there was no other choice than to go down and push away speculators 
(Matthew Campbell and Peter Levring, 2016). 
 
“There’s no sharp, disruptive movement when you pass below zero. It’s just 
working like very low interest rates,” said Denmark’s National Governor Lars Rohde. 
 
This implies that Denmark obliged large and medium-sized companies to pay 
lenders (individuals are free of duty for now) and also gave a chance to some fortunate 
homeowners to actually yield a profit on the mortgages. Looking at the theoretical 
consequences of the NIR, some dovish economists do expect hard hit on economy in the 
future although there is no empirical evidence of any distortions like asset bubbles, 
capital flight etc. yet. However, Denmark managed to get back to the zero level, as can 
be seen on Figure 4 but only for a couple of months as they were forced to react to the 
prevailing situation at the end of 2014. 
 





Figure 4 - Denmark temporarily retrieved to positive interest rates for several months during the year 2014 
(from July to September) 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com 
3.3 Role of the European Central Bank 
These several ventures with sub-zero interest rates widened thinking of central 
authorities when it comes to economic stagnation. Unceasing increase of unemployment 
across whole the  Eurozone, unpersuasive growth rate floating just above zero line, and 
inflation already on the way back threatening to cross the zero line (see Box 1) 
compelled bankers to consider an unorthodox solution. In the mid-2014, the ECB as the 
first major monetary institution agreed to move deposit rates into the negative territory 
in order to prevent falling into a deflationary spiral and “to underpin the firm anchoring 
of medium to long- term inflation expectations” (Draghi, 2014). 
 
“Negative interest rates aren’t an irrational concept. I’m not sure, though, 
whether in the case of the ECB it will have the desired effect,” (Christoph Kind, 2012). 
 
 














Box 1 - Set of economic indicators for Eurozone for period 2012-20178 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com 
3.4 Connection with SNB, Riksbank and DNB 
At the turn of 2015, the Swedish Riksbank accommodated the NIR policy with 
the mandate of “safeguarding the role of the inflation target as a nominal anchor for 
price setting and wage formation” (Sveriges Riksbank, 2015)). Both authorities 
(Riksbank and ECB) faced the same concerns and used this unconventional measure 
together with other intervention instruments. The ECB continued with quantitative 
easing and proceeded with purchasing of covered bonds, asset-backed securities and 
funding banks by targeted longer-term refinancing operations while the Riksbank 
initiated a purchase of bonds and interventions on the foreign exchange market by 
January 2016 (BIS Quarterly Review, March 2016). 
According to BIS Quarterly Review (March 2016), the ECB’s initiation of 
monetary easing resulted in money inflow to European countries outside the Eurozone. 
Since Denmark and Switzerland did not accept euro, Danish krone and Swiss franc got 
under the appreciation pressure and in order to cease the surge of liquidity, the central 
banks either introduced negative interest rates on deposits (SNB) or reduced key interest 
rate to negative levels (DNB) alongside other measures. In the case of the SNB, the 
main aim was identified as unaccomplished during 2015 as capital inflow did not vanish 
and pressure on the currency persisted. 
“The negative deposit rate, still at 0.75 percent, and the SNB’s proven 
willingness to sell francs even after removing the cap will help weaken the Swiss 
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currency over time. That can only help the economy, as would healthier growth in the 
euro region” said Thomas Jordan, president of the SNB (2016). 
On the other hand, the combination of the NIR and heavy interventions on the 
FX market field utilized by the DNB yields fruit, situation normalized, money inflow 
had stemmed and at the beginning of 2016, the rates actually moved back a little closer 
from zero to -0,65 (BIS Quarterly Review, March 2016). 
3.5 The last current member of the NIRP – the Bank of Japan 
The last follower of this strategy is Japan in which the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
executed negative rates in January 2016. A week later, for the first time ever, the yield 
on 10-year government bonds briefly turned negative and benchmarks of lending and 
mortgage rates were falling. “The effects (of negative rates) will eventually spread to 
the real economy and consumer prices, and people will see the policy in a positive 
light,” said the BoJ governor Haruhiko Kuroda (2016). 
The decline on the market reached its peak in the mid-2016 when even yield on 
15Y government bond went negative. This might be considered as a result of Japan’s 
hopeless long-lasting fight against deflation and a desperate attempt/step of the BoJ 
after executing numerous monetary tools including not very successful/ineffective 
bond-buying programs of the QQE (Qualitative and quantitative easing) set off in April 
2014 and a couple of the QE’s (Quantitative Easing) tryouts initiated in 1997 (the 
second one in 2001). The main aim of these policies was to achieve a sustainable level 
inflation of 2% within a period of two years. The QQE strategy failed to achieve this 
goal but Hiroshi Fujiki and Hajime Tomura (2015) argue that it would be significantly 
expensive for the BoJ to exit the QQE program. In their study, they considered “simple 
macroeconomic scenarios to run simulations under transparent assumptions. Thus, the 
simulation results in this paper should be taken as ballpark figures of the BoJ’s future 
profit based on one of a number of possible scenarios, rather than a point estimate of 
the BoJ’s future profit based on macroeconomic projections.” Huge public debt, 
stagnation in inflation, depreciated yen – all of this contributed to negative interest rates 
to incur a failure in Japan. 
3.6 The current situation 
 “Lowering the rate further into negative territory was seen as an effective tool 
for providing additional monetary easing, which also reinforced the impact of the other 




monetary policy measures in place by stimulating the “velocity of reserves”, as written 














Figure 5 - Central Bank Policy rates of countries with introduced negative interest rates (except US) 
 
The development of the interest rates in advanced countries has experienced 
almost no change in the course of last year (depicted in Figure 5). The institution in the 
role of the US central bank, the FED, has been of opinion that it is time to leave zero 
rates and thus it raised interest rates to the current level of 1%. It had done so only for 
the third time since 2007. However, the US inflation overstepped targeted limit of 2% 
but as we saw in the past, the FED is willing to let inflation float over this limit in order 
to let the monetary policy accommodate. Although quantitative easing has not been a 
monetary instrument used by the FED for quite some time, the decision to reduce its 
balance sheet has not been taken yet. On the other hand, the ECB and BoJ are still 
carrying on with their monetary injections of estimated $200 billion of purchases per 
month. The perspective development of inflation across the currency block and the 
current plan of the ECB to maintain its bond-buying program until December 2017 form 
a very important thought in people’s minds - when and how will the ECB end monetary 
easing? Main point of concern is that abandoning it too early can jeopardize all the 
effort done so far to stabilize the price and on the other hand getting out too late can 
drive the inflation excessively high. Nevertheless, “the withdrawal of QE is sending a 
signal of confidence that central banks have in growth,” as said by Peter Oppenheimer, 




the member of Board of Directors of Goldman Sachs. In addition, all three key interest 
rates of the Eurozone (the interest rate on the main refinancing operations, the rate on 
the deposit facility and the rate on the marginal lending facility) are consistently falling, 
as we can see in Figure 6. Despite the current zero level of refinancing rate and deposit 
rate being pushed even deeper below zero at the rate of -0.40%, there was no further 












Figure 6 - ECB key interest rates in percentages per annum9 
Source: www.ecb.europa.eu 
In Sweden, the policy of negative interest rate is still kept associated with the 
description of “had the intended effect”. Furthermore, The Riksbank gave some 
suggestions about going further down with the interest rates. Inflation is slowly 
approaching expected 2% level, economic growth is strong enough and at the end of 
year 2016 the bank announced another purchase of government bonds in the nominal 
value of SEK 275 billion. But there are concerns about overheating housing market as 
prices are rapidly rising. Swiss SNB also has no plans to make any changes in their 
monetary policy and it keeps its 3-month LIBOR rate at -0.75% since January 2015. 
Likewise, Demark is currently in a similar situation as there is no reconsideration of the 
monetary policy on the table.   
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4 Commodity market 
In this chapter, we will summarize the events of last few years that occurred on 
the commodity market and afterwards we will inspect the connection with interest rates. 
 
4.1 Progress and fall 
The steady decline in global commodity prices in the last few years has reflected 
the slowing demand and decrease in investments. Furthermore, some have stressed the 
similarities in these economic issues and the ones during 2008. Nine years ago we were 
dealing with financial crisis generated by massive disruptions in the financial services 
industry caused by inconsistent handling of mortgages by the banks but current situation 
has certainly its roots in this financial crisis.  
“With such enormous bucks devoted to trading in oil and other commodities, the 
distortions that they cause have been exacerbated” – Gary Weiss, American 
investigative journalist 
Disturbances in the consumption and investments during economic crisis 
decreased the amount of imports into Europe and the United States, lowering sales 
revenues of export-oriented countries and thus damaging their economies. China, the 
second largest economy in the world, was particularly hit by these events. Right at the 
time of a slow-down by structural reasons, the combination of these two components 
highlighted unsustainability of its economic growth. Such a hit on world’s engine of 
industrial growth had a tremendous impact on the commodity market. George Friedman 
(2016) stated that the excess supply was created by an overestimation of the 
development on the market. Firstly, a disproportionate expected demand, created mainly 
by China, boosted the extraction of commodities. Primary signs of the downturn were 
then ignored and prices maintained due to the massive demand from China based on the 
assumed comeback of growth. Moreover, the reliance on cyclical behavior kept prices 
up even after a decline in China’s imports
10
. Therefore, the hardest impact of this 
collapse in investing was on commodity-exporting emerging and developing economies 
(Special Focus, World Bank / Commodity Market). In addition, also countries exporting 
manufactured goods were hurt. Thus it can be believed that economies mostly hit were 
China (manufactured goods), Russia (energy commodities), Saudi Arabia (crude oil), 
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 It was believed that decline in consumption is just temporary/seasonal and that there is no need to slow 
the production down 




South Korea (manufacture goods from cars to electronics), Australia (industrial 
commodities, particularly iron ore and copper) etc. Therefore, the theory of international 
trade and its benefits is being tested by these events.
11
 
Although the decline in export market affected almost all commodities, 
particularly mineral exporters and oil producers suffered enormously. “Energy makes up 
such a tremendous part of the economic landscape that any time you have a downward 
price pressure it’s like a gift to the entire economy” – Joel Kurtzman (2012). As can be 
seen in Box 3 (see Appendix 4), majority of commodities were falling down till the end 
of 2015 but it seems like there are signs of a recovery. “Prices for most commodities 
appear to have bottomed out last year and are on track to climb in 2017,” said John 
Baffes, Senior Economist and lead author of the Commodity Markets Outlook. 
“However, changes in policies could alter this path.”  
 
4.2 Is there a connection between prices of commodities and 
interest rates? 
When analyzing the movement in prices of commodities on the market, the 
typical approach is to look at certain micro factors which differ from mineral to mineral 
or crop to crop. Among the obvious factors, we should count in the weather conditions 
in crop industry or technology which is used for gathering of oil. Surely, the majority of 
variability in commodity market is caused by facts or processes of this nature but there 
are also some other factors that have to be taken into account such as macroeconomic 
variables or monetary actions. Big macroeconomic factors can be considered as 
significant – like interest rates that are usually overlooked due to a more essential 
economic growth in the case of commodities. 
However, before we continue, it is important to clarify one aspect of the interest 
rate and thus defining the distinction between “nominal” interest rate and “real” interest 
rate. The interest rate which is publicly discussed and stated on basic loan papers is so-
called “nominal” interest rate. After taking the inflation into account, we refer to the 
“real” interest rate. The simplified equation looks like this:                       
                             (also known as Fisher’s equation). Therefore, 
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 Taking into account that a shock of this magnitude on the individual closed economy would have much 
worse consequences. 




according to J.A. Frankel, in connection with commodity prices, we refer to the “real” 
interest rate. 
According to T.Palaskas and P. Varangis (1989), Q.F.Akram (2008) and J. 
Frankel (2012), there is a correlation between the “real” interest rate and commodity 
prices. Looking at the historical data, nearly all commodities were on the rise during the 
mid to late 1970s and went up again between 2000 and 2008 - right during the times 
when the real interest rate was at zero or even negative. All this development is 
supported by the opposite co-movement found in the Figure 8. The graph below depicts 
the development of the Real Commodity Price index on a normal scale together with 
time series for real interest rate on an inverted scale. The author selected aggregate 
Moody’s Commodity price index over prices of individual commodities due to the 
potential that “… the host of idiosyncratic factors that influences each individual sector 
may wash out.” 
The core of this correlation is based on the cost of holding the inventories known 
as “cost of carry”. In general, a low interest rate environment secures cheaper financing 
of inventories (costs associated with holding goods/materials under your roof). It is also 
necessary to take several other factors into account when thinking about how/why low 
interest rates should drive prices of commodities up 
Figure 7 - Opposite co-movement of the Real Commodity Price index and the Real Interest Rate 
Source: www.hks.harvard.edu 




- by demotivating owners to extract the commodity now due to low 
interest earnings, thus decreasing supply and pushing prices up – so-
called “Now versus later”, 
- by encouraging speculators to make commodity contracts when looking 
for things to buy due to low yields , e.g. from treasury bills, 
- by appreciating the domestic currency to challenge the price of domestic 
commodities to go down on the international market (even if there is no 
real change in price for other countries). 
All these mechanisms contribute to progressivity of prices as can be deducted 
from behavior of commodities in 2007-2008 and 2011, according to J.Frankel (2012). 
Conversely, it is in contradiction with the results of a study conducted by the 
aforementioned author in 2009 where he claims that there is no direct evidence that easy 
monetary policy and low real interest rates contribute to upward pressure on real prices 
of disparate set of commodities
12
. In addition, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1988) argue that 
there is a significant co-movement among prices of objects on commodity market not 
caused as a consequence of anything that can be explained by macroeconomic variables 
such as interest rates, inflation etc. They also performed research on a wide spectrum of 
commodities
13
 examining an excessive common development from 1960 to 1985. One 
caveat can be raised (and also was raised by researchers themselves) that 
macroeconomic factors have a higher impact over longer holding periods than monthly 
frequency therefore exclusion of these variables could possibly increase unexplained 
similar movement. Nevertheless, the spill-over effect among commodity prices can be 
related,to some extent, to the substitution effect (Q.F.Akram, 2008). If there is increase 
in price of one commodity, the investors can transfer their funds to its substitute with 
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 Among analyzed commodities were wheat, cotton, copper, gold, crude oil, lumber, and cocoa. 




5 Data description 
Following paragraphs will be devoted to a general description of what the 
dataset looks like and an approach in the selection of variables. The significant 
modifications were made to the original data mainly due to missing values and 
aggregation. 
5.1 Sources 
The dataset used for the analysis consists primarily of four main datasets.  
The first one contains monthly data on Inflation. This database is administrated 
by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
The next two datasets from data-collection maintained by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) include records of interest rates and GDPs. The Central Bank 
Policy Rates were acquired from the International Financial Statistics (the IFS) that 
stores data monthly and GDP from The World Economic Outlook (WEO). The WEO 
database is created and published aside the WEO exercise semi annually (results are 
available in April and September). Both the IFS and WEO belong to Fund’s principal 
statistical datasets.  
The last dataset contains prices of energy, metal, and industrial commodities 
obtained from The World Bank database. These are presented in the Commodity Price 
Data (also known as the Pink Sheet) and have been updated monthly since 1960. Each 
commodity is recorded in its most suitable/common unit for the market, e.g. gold is 
measured in $/toz (abbreviation for troy ounce, approximately 31.1 grams), crude oil in 
$/bbl (abbreviation for barrel, approximately 159 liters), aluminum in $/mt 
(abbreviation for metric ton which equals 1000 kg) etc.  
These selections were perceived, among other sources, to be the most suitable 
for analytical purposes of this research as they code necessary information in a concise 
way. However, beside these four main datasets, other sources were be used in order to 
obtain missing data for certain countries. 
5.2 Manipulation 
A few issues arose from the construction of datasets. At the start, as pool of 
countries in each dataset differs, we selected the countries from the intersection. This 
sample was after that considered as not large enough and therefore not suitable for 




aggregation. Hence, in order to incorporate as many countries as possible, the data from 
other sources were added. This extra information was needed only in the case of the 
CBPR data and it followed in two phases. The first phase – Euro Area. As most of 
European countries are members of the Eurozone, their monetary policy is under 
surveillance of the European Central Bank (ECB) and thus the dataset of the CBPR lists 
only the interest rate of the Eurozone and non-euro countries. However, all Eurozone 
members have their individual inflation rates and, of course, GDP. Therefore, all these 
countries were added to the CBPR dataset with the values of the Eurozone (while 
naturally taking into account their admission date). The second phase dealt with 
incomplete series of some countries. Missing values where restored from the datasets of 
central banks or other relevant sources. Due to month-to-month granularity of inflation, 
the CBPR and mainly commodity prices dataset, the most of the modification was done 
with the GDP data. As mentioned in the previous subchapter, the GDP dataset has 
annual records and this brought up a question regarding the further approach. Due to the 
consecutive aggregation of all collections and, in particular, the construction of GDP-
related variable, the constant trend was selected over the linear one
14
 when formatting 
monthly records of the GDP. The further modification was done by the aforementioned 
aggregation through countries of all datasets apart from commodities. In addition, after 
a detailed look into the databases, it was decided that year 2000 is the relevant starting 
point and other data was edited this way. 
5.3 Variables 
All following variables are of monthly frequency, covering the time period from 
2000 to 2016. 
In this research, we take the price of each commodity as a dependent variable. 
As it was explained in the previous subchapters, raw data of commodities were 
appropriately structured so there was no need to do any modification to it. Each 
commodity used in this study is listed in Table 1 together with its unit and basic 
statistics. Values of prices are nominal and refer to dollar per given unit. In Box 3 (see 
Appendix 4), we can observe a decline in prices of all listed commodities before 2016 
with a following recovery continuing till now for all but precious metals that have been 
experiencing a downward pressure since the last quarter of 2016. The correlation matrix 
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 Linear method was considered as uncommon approach so all the months in the same year had the same 
annual value. 




(see Appendix 7) is showing, in average, relatively strong positive correlation among all 
selected commodities. However, we can observe weaker dependency of Nickel, Zinc 
















Table 1 - Selected commodities with basic statistical description15 
 
In the case of regressors, we control for the Inflation, Central bank policy rate 
and GDP ratio. Inflation rate is measured by the annual growth rate in the consumer 
price index (CPI). Due to substantial changes in interest rate in the past few years, it was 
decided to select the Central bank policy rate among interest rates. This interest rate is 
used by the central banks to signal its monetary policy view. The specific financial 
instrument covered by the CBPR can vary from country to country. For instance, some 
countries use the repurchase agreement rate as the CBPR while in the other ones, it 
stands for the discount rate. The overall Central bank policy rate of 33 countries (listed 
in Appendix 5) was aggregated together and thus created the CBPR variable which 
denotes mean value of the CBPR in the world (keeping in mind that this average just 
approximates the real world’s average CBPR). Moreover, this interest rate is of the 
nominal level, in contrast with almost all studies. The main reason for this unusual 
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 mt – metric tonne, bbl - , toz – Troy ounce, dmtu – dry metric tonne (same mass value as a metric 
tonne, but the material has been dried to decrease the moisture level), mmbtu – indicate 1000000 
BTU (British thermal unit) 
Commodity Unit Min Median Mean Max
Aluminum $ / mt 1282 1816 1907 3071
Coal $ / mt 22,25 59,83 65,83 180,00
Copper $ / mt 1377 5559 5184 9868
Crude oil, Brendt $ / bbl 18,60 58,96 64,92 133,87
Crude oil, Dubai $ / bbl 17,53 56,72 62,05 131,22
Crude oil, WTI $ / bbl 19,31 59,27 62,50 133,93
Gold $ / toz 260,5 873,7 869,0 1772,1
Iron ore $ / dmtu 28,79 67,65 84,72 197,12
Natural gas LNG $ / mmbtu 3,96 7,68 9,28 18,11
Natural gas, US $ / mmbtu 1,17 4,25 4,82 13,52
Nickel $ / mt 4825 14565 16026 52179
Platinum $ / toz 429,9 1121,4 1121,3 2052,4
Rubber $ / kg 0,49 1,76 2,03 6,92
Silver $ / toz 4,02 13,82 14,65 42,70
Tin $ / mt 3694 14742 13879 32363
Zinc $ / mt 747,6 1853,9 1793,8 4405,4




approach is to include information of the level of nominal interest rate and inflation 
since the real interest rate does not differ between the nominal interest rate and inflation 
both of 8 % and both of 1 %. 
The last dependent variable, prop_of_GDP , measures the percentage proportion 
in GDP of countries with the introduced negative CBPR against the total world’s GDP. 
Gross domestic product obtained from the IMF database is based on the purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) valuation of country’s GDP
16
 in order to enable a comparison and it 
is measured in current international dollars. This variable is a “special one” created to 
study the respective power of negative interest rates through economic output. In theory, 
a strong big economy, like the US, that agreed to negative rates is likely to somehow 
influence the commodity market. However, what about the combined power of smaller 
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standards and mainly due to stability of PPP exchange rate.  
 





An inspection of the dataset uncovered that we are dealing with time-series. The 
original nature of data would lead us to think that the combination of time-series and 
cross-sections should be used, thus a panel data or pooled cross-sectional data. 
However, regarding the fact that we are dealing with commodity prices, it is more 
appropriate to aggregate the datasets and use clear time-series. An overall depiction of 
methodology - the methods used during the model creation and introduction of our 
research model - will follow in the next paragraphs. 
 
Wooldridge (2012) offers method of linear regression of time-series that will be 
applied in this research - the method of the ordinary least squares (OLS). When 
estimating the OLS using time-series data examining contemporaneous relationship 
between variables made by time-series data, we refer to a model like this  
 
                                                    
 
In this model,    represents the time index,    is a number of observations,   
stands for        variable if there is   of them. 
Given this approach, we expect our model to be constructed in this form: 
 
                                          
 
In a brief explanation, we regress the price of a single commodity on average 
inflation in the world, the average interest rate in the world, and proportion of countries 
with the NIR expressed in % of the world's GDP. 
While we are dealing with time-series, we are obliged to inspect a couple of 
characteristics before we can approach the model itself. The stochastic processes in 
time-series require that OLS models have to be stationary in order to maintain the 
ability of making statistical inference trustworthy. If not, the models with non-stationary 
variables will result in a spurious regression due to bias in estimated coefficients. 
Therefore, we performed a test for unit-root on all our variables. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test was selected from the pool of tests for examining stationarity and 




revealed a presence of unit-root in each variable
17
. Results can be found in Table 3 (see 
Appendix 6). 
Therefore, we can conclude that all series are integrated of at least order one and 
the information provided by the lagged level of series has no relevance in predicting the 
change in the original series with no lag. At this point, we can decide between two 
options. 
The first alternative is differencing the series making them stationary as the first 
differences of the majority of time-series processes are stationary. Afterwards, the 
vector autoregression model (VAR) is used. Nevertheless, the main drawback of this 
approach lies in the loss of an important “long run” relationship between the levels. The 
second option is to test for so-called “cointegration”. If some linear combination of two 
or more integrated series has a lower order of integration then this series are said to be 
cointegrated. This vector of coefficients usually forms a stationary linear combination of 
these series. Thus if such a condition exists then the best choice is the vector error 
correction model (VECM). If it not such a situation then we get back to the first 
alternative consisting of the VAR model.  
To briefly describe the VECM estimation, this econometric model is utilized to 
discover the linear interdependencies among several time-series. Allowing more 
variables to evolve, the VECM model extends the classic autoregressive models. This 
approach is sometimes called the “restricted” VAR model as the error correction term is 
incorporated into the standard VAR model due to the cointegration of variables used in 
the model. Including the error correction term permits us to use basic statistics and rely 
on the resulting inference. 
The most frequent test for cointegration is the Johansen test where asymptotic 
properties play an important role. If the sample is too small, the results’ reliability is 
shattered. In addition, it is important to set the appropriate number of lags of given 
variables. In our case, it was estimated to two. We had enough observations and 
fortunately, the tests confirmed that the cointegration exists in all models (for each 
commodity, see Table 3 in Appendix 6). Moreover, the Johansen test also determined 
the rank of cointegration to 1. Hence one linear combination of selected series that is 
stationary certainly exists. This verification allows us to continue towards the VECM 
estimation. The examples of VECM application in this area of expertise are papers by 
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 Although for some variables test could prove stationarity, the level of confidence for rejecting the null 
hyphotesis was not high enough. 




T.Palaskas and P. Varangis (1989) or Gil et al. (2009). The results of our estimation are 


































In the previous chapter, we discussed the approach and introduced the final 
method used in/for this research. Now we can proceed towards an analysis of the 
regression and inference. 
At the beginning, we inspected any connection between commodities. From the 
correlation matrix it can be easily observed that there is a high correlation among 
selected materials. In the case of energy, it is understandable (also because there are 
prices from a different market of one commodity). However, there is also a really strong 
co-movement of prices through the whole sample, with no regard to the type. This trend 
is studied in the paper by Pindyck and Rotemberg (1988). If we look at our explanatory 
variables, it is not surprising that there is a significant correlation between inflation and 
nominal interest rate as higher inflation drives up the nominal interest rates. The NIR 
proportion on GDP seems to be slightly negatively connected with the previous two 
variables. An overall look reveals that inflation and interest rates tend to move in 
opposite direction than commodity prices. 
In this analysis our aim was to investigate relationships between selected 
variables. Therefore we did not continue to estimate the IRF in order to look at the 
short-run dynamics nor did we proceed to prediction section. Tables in the Box 2 with 
results show the coefficients of individual variables, t-statistics and significance of the 
given estimate. As this analysis does not compute any predictions or nor does 
comparison of models with different specifications, it was decided that goodness-of-fit 
measures of the model like R-squared will not be interpreted. 
The VECM model, like all the other models, needs to satisfy certain assumptions 
in order to maintain the ability of relevant interpretation. Verification of these 
assumptions revealed, in some cases, potential for heteroskedastic residuals (see 
Appendix 7). Thus the interpretation of the analysis is just an approximation due to 
potentially inconsistent variance in the residuals. We will now proceed to a comment on 
the relationship between nominal macroeconomic factors and individual prices of 
commodities. The results of regression can be seen in Box 2. 

























Box 2 - VECM estimation 
In line with the expectations, the analysis showed that prices of commodities are 
strongly influenced by movement of nominal interest rate and inflation. This qualitative 
effect can be illustrated like this: 
                                              
Given Fisher equation 
       
and the results of Frankel’s research  
                                                 
it should hold that if ceteris paribus nominal interest rates go up than 
commodities should be less valuable. 
Unsurprisingly, our research revealed expected qualitative effects. If there is, in 
average, increase in inflation or decline in nominal interest rates there is upward 
Aluminum.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Coal.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -1611,2549 5,5297 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -50,0847 7,9690 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 2744,6008 -5,8647 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 71,8261 -7,1950 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -71,6513 0,2035 0,8389 prop_of_GDP.l2 -1,2522 0,1640 0,8699
const -669,3132 0,6732 0,5016 const 32,5169 -1,5380 0,1126
Copper.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Crude_oil_B.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -3782,3860 6,7953 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -44,8429 7,5048 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 5032,0114 -5,6452 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 58,3723 -6,1370 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -522,3069 0,7760 0,4386 prop_of_GDP.l2 -8,9408 1,2334 0,2189
const 4250,5494 -2,2423 0.02602 * const 60,3369 -2,9808 0,0032 **
Crude_oil_D.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Crude_oil_W.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -44,7047 7,4945 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -38,5885 7,1670 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 58,3140 -6,1440 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 50,7719 -5,9180 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -8,5161 1,1770 0,2406 prop_of_GDP.l2 -8,0677 1,2371 0,2175
const 56,7250 -2,8095 0.005449 ** const 57,0810 -3,1310 0,0020 **
Gold.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Iron_ore.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -645,1770 8,1055 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -76,2339 7,7790 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 793,5290 -6,2702 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 109,4060 -6,9689 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -2,8110 0,0290 0,9769 prop_of_GDP.l2 -11,2198 0,9627 0,3368
const 887,4759 -3,2899 0,0012 ** const 37,3778 -1,1387 0,2562
Natural_gas_LNG.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Natural_gas_US.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -8,3366 7,2340 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 5,9996 -5,4712 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 11,8860 -6,4570 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 -9,7245 5,5752 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -1,3883 0,9929 0,3219 prop_of_GDP.l2 -0,5397 0,4049 0,6860
const 4,5265 -1,1592 0,2477 const 13,4107 -3,6093 0,0004 ***
Nickel.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Platinum.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -134595,2100 5,2486 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -570,6200 7,4729 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 231733,9300 -5,6637 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 743,4900 -6,0917 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -939,4100 0,0302 0,9759 prop_of_GDP.l2 -94,1230 1,0247 0,3067
const -210426,0700 2,4169 0,0165 * const 1040,3000 -4,0379 0,0001 ***
Rubber.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Silver.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -1,5302 8,1245 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -13,0408 8,1364 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 2,0112 -6,7049 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 16,9304 -6,6407 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -0,3028 1,3206 0,1881 prop_of_GDP.l2 -0,5927 0,3043 0,7612
const 1,7546 -2,7490 0,0065 ** const 12,0823 -2,2241 0,0272 *
Tin.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level Zinc.l2 Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) Sign. Level
CBPR.l2 -10408,4100 7,8730 0,0000 *** CBPR.l2 -13038,9660 5,1805 0,0000 ***
Inflation.l2 13458,0500 -6,3777 0,0000 *** Inflation.l2 22367,2041 -5,5553 0,0000 ***
prop_of_GDP.l2 -34,4670 0,0216 0,9828 prop_of_GDP.l2 -153,5073 0,0502 0,9600
const 11801,4769 -2,6341 0,0091 ** const -19945,8300 2,3236 0,0211 *
*** p < 0,001 , ** p < 0,01 , * p < 0,05 ,  blank means insignificant variable




pressure on prices of commodities. This holds up for all but one commodity – 
Crude_oil_US. The one reasonable explanation for this anomaly could be invalidity of 
data due to no cointegration present (the test was inconclusive, see Appendix 6). 
Although the important outcome of this regression is qualitative information of the 
variables it seems like that the inflation can be more informative and influential than 
nominal interest rates. But this is not the case of such a quantitative study. 
Unfortunately, our constructed variable is found to provide no relevant information to 
the development on commodity market. Therefore, we can conclude, that negative 
interest rates have not revealed any hidden influence for now. 
Nevertheless, there are some directions in which can be this paper improved. 
Including the omitted variables is one possibility. Another improvement of this study is 
to widen the pool of the countries that are selected to be averaged.  We selected mostly 
developed countries with a similar decreasing movement of inflation and nominal 
interest rate. When assessing effects on commodity prices we should take such 
territories into consideration where these minerals and raw materials are mined or 
gathered, like Africa, Australia and West Asia. The selection of the countries before 
averaging did not include big exporters like Australia (Coal, Iron Ore), Venezuela (Oil), 
Sudan (Oil, Natural gas), Uzbekistan (Gold, Copper) etc. that suffer from high inflation 
and interest rates (except Australia). On the other hand, data from these regions are hard 
to obtain on a monthly basis for such a long period of time. 
One of the biggest limitations of this paper is potentially heteroscedastic 
residuals. We allowed for more strict p-value for rejection and consequently approached 
with caution to the inference. We suggest for future analysis to improve the model and 
















The world’s economic situation has been balancing on the edge in the last 
decade. The strike of financial recession in 2008 liquidated companies and brought 
droughts to the financial system. The statement of (L.B.Smaghi, 2009): “In abnormal 
times conventional monetary policy tools may prove insufficient to achieve the central 
bank’s objective.” proved to be true. The central banks were forced to lower interest 
rates to the minimum of zero lower bound and eventually to implement unconventional 
measures like quantitative easing. This monetary tool should persuade banks to loan 
more and to reboot the economy (C.O.Roche, 2014). It has proved to mitigate some 
economic issues since the crisis according to the International Monetary Fund (Klyuev 
et al. 2009) and the U.S. Federal Reserve System (Stein, 2012). Nevertheless, it was not 
enough in final calculation and we were therefore introduced to the policy of negative 
interest rates. 
The main aim of this paper was to inspect the theory, development and 
consequent impacts of negative interest rates in detail.  We were interested in questions 
related to the impact of macroeconomic factors on interest-sensitive markets and 
particularly on the commodity market. As expected, we found sufficient evidence that 
nominal interest rates and inflation can be important determinants of commodity prices. 
The sample consisted of 16 commodities (energy, metals and industrial materials) which 
demonstrated a high intermarket correlation of prices. The regression required the use of 
Vector Error Correction model (VECM) and confirmed a negative effect of the nominal 
Central bank policy rate (CBPR) as well as a positive inflation effect on commodity 
prices. This indicates that if the nominal interest rates (CBPR) decline then commodities 
become more valuable. It was intended to extend the range of Frankel’s (2012) study of 
opposite co-movement between the real interest rates and real commodity prices but 
with regard to information hidden in nominal interest rates and inflation. This goal was 
successfully achieved. Nevertheless, the main purpose of finding relationship between 
newly adopted negative interest rates and commodity market fluctuations failed due to 
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Appendix 4: Development of commodity prices









Box 3- Long-run development of commodity prices 
Appendix 6: Pool of countries before aggregation 
Countries included in the research: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Chile, China, Iceland, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Russia, the Slovak Republic, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States. 














Table 2- Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root 
 
Dickey-Fuller p-value Dickey-Fuller p-value Dickey-Fuller p-value
CBPR -3.2586  0.0796 -2.5482  0.3464 -2.8947  0.2012
Inflation -3.3325  0.0673 -3.1659  0.09506 -3.4435  0.04932
prop_of_GDP -0.30345  0.9899 -0.21161  0.99 -0.13113  0.99
Aluminum -2.1358  0.5192 -2.303  0.4491 -2.6677  0.2963
Coal -2.3814  0.4163 -2.7423  0.2651 -2.5095  0.3626
Copper -2.0501  0.5551 -2.0254  0.5654 -1.9817  0.5837
Crude_oil_B -2.1826  0.4996 -2.2554  0.469 -2.113  0.5287
Crude_oil_D -2.3487  0.43 -2.4638  0.3817 -1.9299  0.6054
Crude_oil_W -2.4625  0.3823 -2.7213  0.2739 -2.4542  0.3858
Gold -0.88641  0.9524 -0.79113  0.9609 -0.84081  0.9565
Iron_ore -2.1381  0.5182 -1.9596  0.593 -2.1265  0.5231
Natural_gas_LNG -0.82863  0.9576 -1.5809  0.7517 -1.4483  0.8072
Natural_gas_US -3.2539  0.0804 -3.2795  0.07612 -3.4026  0.05561
Nickel -2.3249  0.4399 -2.2111  0.4876 -1.8722  0.6296
Platinum -1.9015  0.6173 -2.1949  0.4944 -2.2059  0.4898
Rubber -2.1592  0.5094 -1.9622  0.5919 -2.4479  0.3884
Silver -1.684  0.7085 -1.4093  0.8236 -1.3769  0.8372
Tin -2.3355  0.4355 -2.8236  0.231 -2.7824  0.2483
Zinc -2.2306  0.4794 -1.9827  0.5833 -1.9772  0.5856
k=1 k=2 k=3Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test for unit-root











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 7: Assumptions verification  
 
The “Asymptotic” Gauss-Markov Assumptions for time series regression 
Due to large enough sample (over 200 observations) it is sufficient to satisfy just 
asymptotic assumptions to enable valid inference: 
1 Linearity and Weak Dependence – We assume linear relationship between 
regressands and regressors. The revealed cointegration (see Table XX) provides 
the linear combination of variables that is stationary. 
2 No Perfect Collinearity – Correlation matrix below provides correlation 
coefficients and confirms no perfect correlation between prices of commodities 
and independent variables. 
 
Table 4 - Correlation matrix 
3 Zero Conditional Mean – After graphical verification we assume that this 
assumption holds. 
4 Homoskedasticity – If this assumption is violated, the residuals do not have 
constant variance and the statistical inference is invalid. The most common test 
for heteroskedasticity is Breuch-Pagan test. Unfortunately, the test showed 
potential for inconsistent variance in errors – mainly in the case of Silver. 






































































































prop_of_GDP -0,31 -0,36 1
Aluminum -0,13 -0,05 -0,19 1
Coal -0,46 -0,21 0,01 0,63 1
Copper -0,59 -0,46 0,01 0,77 0,82 1
Crude_oil_B -0,53 -0,33 -0,13 0,65 0,85 0,91 1
Crude_oil_D -0,54 -0,34 -0,13 0,63 0,85 0,91 1,00 1
Crude_oil_W -0,49 -0,31 -0,15 0,70 0,85 0,90 0,98 0,98 1
Gold -0,76 -0,61 0,27 0,32 0,74 0,81 0,80 0,81 0,73 1
Iron_ore -0,41 -0,20 -0,13 0,71 0,90 0,88 0,90 0,89 0,90 0,70 1
Natural_gas_LNG -0,59 -0,40 -0,07 0,36 0,74 0,77 0,87 0,88 0,82 0,87 0,73 1
Natural_gas_US 0,34 0,29 -0,34 0,47 0,07 0,02 0,08 0,05 0,18 -0,38 0,14 -0,18 1
Nickel -0,17 -0,20 -0,21 0,87 0,47 0,70 0,54 0,52 0,57 0,28 0,62 0,29 0,34 1
Platinum -0,57 -0,41 -0,06 0,73 0,88 0,95 0,93 0,93 0,93 0,80 0,93 0,78 0,10 0,65 1
Rubber -0,52 -0,31 -0,09 0,64 0,82 0,85 0,81 0,80 0,77 0,73 0,86 0,65 -0,02 0,58 0,87 1
Silver -0,64 -0,45 0,11 0,47 0,79 0,85 0,85 0,85 0,77 0,94 0,78 0,83 -0,28 0,40 0,85 0,85 1
Tin -0,68 -0,52 0,19 0,50 0,85 0,88 0,87 0,87 0,84 0,92 0,83 0,84 -0,20 0,44 0,89 0,82 0,91 1
Zinc -0,33 -0,40 0,12 0,80 0,42 0,78 0,54 0,53 0,56 0,45 0,53 0,37 0,14 0,83 0,63 0,50 0,48 0,52 1




Silver were not included into inference due to this issue (null hypothesis was 
rejected).  For all the other commodities we chose level of significance to be 
lower than 0.01 for the rejection of homoskedasticity hypothesis. To our level of 
knowledge of VECM model we considered it to be appropriate. Also it is 
considered as one of the biggest limitations of this analysis. 
 
Table 5 - Results of Breuch-Pegan test (Heteroskedasticity) and Breusch-Godfrey test (Serial Correlation) 
5 No Serial Correlation – This issue is always a threat when dealing with time-



















Tests for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation
B-P test B-G test
